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REFERENCES TO PARTIES
The parties are defendants/appellants John Seamons dba Big O
Tire and Treco Inc. ("defendants"), and plaintiff/appellee
Natalie H. Corbett ("plaintiff").
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT ON ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In her opposing brief plaintiff reorders and restates
defendants' Issue No. 2, and disputes the standard of review
defendants suggest for that issue.

Plaintiff misapprehends the

issues raised by defendants' appeal, but does frame the nature of
the parties' dispute.
Plaintiff would have this Court address the question whether
there was any evidence whatsoever from which a jury could
conclude plaintiff had lost some earning capacity, and if so
uphold the jury's verdict in the amount of nearly $70,000.00 for
such alleged loss under a deferential standard.

See Plaintiff's

Brief at pp. 1-2.
But the issue raised by defendants and addressed by the
authorities defendants cite is different:
There is no doubt from the entire record that the
plaintiff sustained severe, permanent, and disabling
injuries, which affected his past and future earning
capacity. The question is, however, whether the
evidence submitted was sufficiently probative and free
from prejudicial error to permit the jury to make a
finding on this [lost earning capacity] element of
damages.
See Featherly v. Continental Insurance Co., 243 N.W.2d 806, 809
(Wis. 1976) (overturning verdict on earning capacity purportedly

lost by business owner based on principles discussed in
Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 924, comment c ) .
The sufficiency issue here is whether labor replacement
costs to a separate business entity, which business itself
derived income from sources other than plaintiff's labor, is
sufficiently probative to constitute the legally sustainable
basis for the jury's award of lost personal earnings capacity in
the amount of $70,000.00, when there was no foundational evidence
plaintiff had ever derived personal earnings from the business,
no showing the loss of plaintiff's time actually caused either
the business or plaintiff herself to lose any net income, and no
showing that the value of plaintiff's continued or unaffected
time in the business was decreased by her change in activity.
Defendants submit this issue is primarily a question of law,
and one of first impression in this state.

For the reasons set

forth herein defendants request this Court's finding that the
labor replacement cost evidence is inadmissible under the
circumstances, and that even if admissible, the evidence is not
sufficiently probative to prove plaintiff lost earning capacity
in the amount claimed, or in any particular amount.

1

The other issues not substantially restated in plaintiff's
brief are related: whether the evidence was admissible at all and
whether, even admitted, it was such that the trial court was
justified in instructing the jury plaintiff's damages "are the
value of her time in the business."
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
CONTRARY TO PLAINTIFF'S ASSERTION, PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
ESTABLISH A LOST EARNING CAPACITY CLAIM IN THE AMOUNTS
THE JURY ULTIMATELY AWARDED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE LINKING THE LABOR REPLACEMENT COST
EVIDENCE TO PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL INCOME OR INCOME
CAPACITY.
Plaintiff first argues her earning capacity claim was
properly established and proved under Clawson v. Walgreen Drug
Co,, 162 P.2d 759 (Utah 1945), because there was unquestionably
evidence:

(1) plaintiff could not perform certain jobs or tasks

in the family business she had previously done; (2) although the
business continued on, the business had to hire replacement labor
to perform those tasks; (3) the replacement labor costs were
reasonable and necessary, at least to the business; and (4)
plaintiff's expert testified these labor replacement costs
represented lost "earning capacity" to plaintiff.

See

Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 10, 13-19.2
It is significant, however, that plaintiff also admits, as
she must, the following:

(1) whether characterized as a sole

2

In the conclusion portion of her brief, but nowhere else,
plaintiff asserts that defendants failed to marshal the evidence.
See Plaintiff's Brief at p. 30. The only evidence defendants
have not described in their brief, however, is the missing
foundational evidence linking plaintiff's labor replacement costs
with any effect on plaintiff's personal income. Compare
Defendants' Brief at pp. 5-19, with Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 1318. Defendants are not required to marshall evidence that isn't
there. See Kraus v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 852 P.2d 1014, 1022
(Utah App. 1993).
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proprietorship, corporation, dba, or other business entity,
plaintiff's "family business" derived income from a variety of
sources other than plaintiff's personal services (unlike, for
example, a physician, whose income is wholly dependent on
personal services); (2) whatever manual tasks plaintiff could not
continue to perform in the business, she could continue, and did
continue, to manage and supervise the business; and (3) there was
no evidence offered as to the effect of the labor replacement
costs on the business's net income, or on plaintiff's personal
income, nor was there any evidence of the value of plaintiff's
time as a manager and supervisor of the business.
Therefore this case is factually distinguishable from
Clawson v. Walgreen Drug, and is analogous to the number of cases
cited by defendants.

As set forth above, the issue in this case

is whether the business's labor replacement costs were
sufficiently probative of plaintiff's personal income capacity to
make an award based on those costs legally sustainable as a
matter of law.

A number of courts have considered this precise

question, including Featherly v. Continental Ins. Co., 243 N.W.2d
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806 (Wis. 1976)3 and Seymour v. House. 305 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Supp.
1957).
In Featherlv, the plaintiff operated a logging partnership
with his wife, and was involved in an automobile accident.

He

did a number a things in the business besides logging and sawing,
including sales, administration, etc. At trial of his negligence
claim, plaintiff introduced evidence showing that net profits
from the logging business dropped over a four year period after
his accident, and the jury awarded $100,000 for lost earning
capacity.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the Restatement
provision § 924 plaintiff relies on here, and held both that the
net profit evidence was improperly admitted, and that even
admitted it did not support a claim of lost earning capacity:
These principles of law [comment c to Restatement
§ 924 and supporting cases] make it clear that the
summary of the profit and losses of [plaintiff's]
logging business were admissible only to the extent
that a foundation was layed to show a clear, causal
connection between the diminution of profits and the
lost earning capacity.
Although the record is replete with evidence that
[plaintiff's] injury diminished the profits from the
business, the record leaves to speculation the extent
3

The difference between Featherly and this case, of course,
is that here plaintiff does not attempt to show a loss measured
by a drop in the business1 net profits, but instead attempts to
show a loss measured by a single increased business expense. As
the court in Seymour noted, such evidence is essentially the same
thing despite plaintiff's protestations that all she is
attempting to prove is a loss to herself. Compare Seymour v.
House, 305 S.W.2d at 6, with Plaintiff's Brief at p. 22.
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to which these profits proportionally or directly
affected the loss of [plaintiff's] earning capacity.

[Plaintiff] failed to show the value of his own
efforts as they contributed to the profits. Although
there was evidence of the market value of [plaintiff's]
work as a logger and as a sawer, there was no evidence
of [plaintiff's] earning capacity as a businessman in
the selection of lumber, its purchase and sale, or the
administration of the business. The only evidence
indicating a connection between [plaintiff's] capacity
to perform work and the profits of the company came
from [plaintiff's] own testimony. He testified that a
"good percentage" of the business profits was related
to what he could do for the business personally and
that the business depended on him.
As we view this record, therefore, [plaintiff]
failed to prove what is required by Wisconsin law—the
quality and value of his services as they effected the
profits of the business. He failed to prove the value
of his services. The figures we derive from the
evidence adduced at trial merely indicate that his
services were valuable to the company, but so were the
services of others and so was the capital investment.
The jury was left to speculate in respect to the
value of plaintiff's earning capacity. This it cannot
be permitted to do.
See Featherly v. Continental Ins. Co., 243 N.W.2d 806, 811-12
(Wis. 1976).

See also Condron v. Harl. 374 P.2d 613, 618-19

(Hawaii 1962) (where court overturned earning capacity verdict
for plaintiff business owner who had actually shown some income,
both gross and net, before the accident because:
This is not a case in which it can be said that the
impairment of earning capacity was such that loss of
earnings therefrom was reasonably certain. Rather, it
is a case in which the impairment of earning capacity
was doubtful and proof of loss of prior earnings was
required to make it reasonably certain. Inability to
work as hard as formerly does not, without more, lend
-6-

itself to measurement under the head of impairment of
earning capacity, inasmuch as the impairment of earning
capacity is too conjectural.
(citations omitted)).
Conversely, in Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Co,, 162 P.2d 759
(Utah 1945), the case was such that impairment of personal
earning capacity was reasonably certain.

The plaintiff was

completely prevented by the injury at issue from pursuing his
business, and therefore from receiving any income therefrom:
"Plaintiff also testified that he was able, before the injury, to
work as a trapper and farmer and that after the injury, he could
not do such work."

See 162 P.2d at 765.

The distinction between Clawson and this case, especially as
it relates to the certainty of the evidence, is that here the
business continued after plaintiff's injury and plaintiff is not
prevented from working in it.

She just could not provide certain

manual labor in the business that she had been previously been
providing.

Whether that inability had any effect whatsoever on

her actual or potential earnings, however, was a matter of
speculation because there was no evidence tying the labor
replacement cost evidence to adverse effect on either net
business income or personal income:
Under the present evidence the jury could only
speculate on that question. And, on the same
principle, there should have been substantial evidence
of the supposed past loss of earnings to support a
finding on the value of the supposed impairment of
plaintiff's ability to work and earn in the future; any
finding of such "impairment" and its pecuniary value
-7-

must be based upon evidence which would permit the jury
to arrive at a reasonable estimate of the future loss;
it may not rest merely upon speculation.
See Seymour v. House, 305 S.W.2d at 6.4
POINT II
MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, THE LABOR REPLACEMENT COST
EVIDENCE, IF IT WAS ADMISSIBLE AT ALL, WAS ONLY A
FACTOR THE JURY COULD CONSIDER IN ARRIVING AT THE VALUE
OF PLAINTIFF'S TIME, AND WAS NOT, AS THE COURT
INSTRUCTED THE JURY, A MEASURE OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES.
Plaintiff's position on the jury instruction issues in this
case ignores a simple and fundamental distinction between the
correct instructions given (and applicable authorities) and the
disputed instruction:

When evidence of increased business

expenses due to a personal injury is sufficiently connected to
personal income to be admissible at all in a personal injury
action, the evidence may be considered by the jury as a factor in
awarding damages for claimed lost earning capacity.

See, e.g..

R. at pp. 303, 305 (MUJI instruction and defendants' Instruction
No. 28 apparently not disputed by plaintiff) and Featherly v.
Continental Ins. Co., 243 N.W.2d at 811-12.

But disputed

Plaintiff argues Seymour is distinguishable because there
was no evidence as to the reasonableness of the rates paid the
replacement labor and here plaintiff called an economic expert to
repeat her assertions. See Plaintiff's Brief at p. 19. Whether
the rates were reasonable, however, is not material and the
expert testimony suffers from the same defect as plaintiff's own
testimony, it is based solely on the labor replacement costs and
does not consider the value of plaintiff's remaining time in the
business or whether plaintiff ever had personal income from the
business. See TR at pp. 169-70, 180-81; R. at pp. 807-08, 81819.
-8-

Instruction No. 29 tells the jury "[plaintiff's] damages are the
value of [her] services in the business during the period."
at p. 306 (emphasis added).

Id.

That distinction gives rise to the

legal error of which defendants complain.
For example, in support of Instruction No. 29, plaintiff
quotes extensively from the comments to Section 924 of the
Restatement (2nd) of Torts.

See Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 22-25.

Plaintiff argues essentially that because Instruction 29 is
derived from the comments, and under certain circumstances labor
replacement costs can constitute a method of proving a loss of
earning capacity, the instruction accurately states the law:
Jury Instruction No. 29 was nothing more than a brief
summary of these authorities taken verbatim from
Comment c of Section 924 of the Restatement (2nd) of
Torts. It is an accurate statement of the law with
respect to proof of loss of impaired earning capacity.
Accordingly, the trial judge was correct and did not
commit prejudicial error in giving Instruction No. 29.
Id.
The only case (or particular factual scenario) plaintiff
cites for that proposition is Ginn v. Penobscot Co., 334 A.2d 874
(Maine 1975).

See Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 23.

In Ginn,

however, plaintiff was a woods operator in business for himself
whose business and income were entirely dependent on his personal
services.

See 334 A.2d at 877. The accident at issue rendered

the plaintiff an invalid, and completely terminated his ability
both to perform the tasks he had previously performed, and to
derive any income from his services.
-9-
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Under the

circumstances, his damages could appropriately be measured by the
cost of replacing his labor in the business, or the value of his
time in the business.
Here, of course, the accident did not render plaintiff an
invalid, but only prevented plaintiff from performing some of the
more manual tasks required by the business.

The business

continued on without plaintiff's manual labor and she continued
to supervise and manage the business, activities which there is
no dispute held value (albeit uncalculated) to the business.
Whatever income the business provided (in this case none prior to
trial) continued to come plaintiff's way, if reduced in some
unquantified amount.

Thus plaintiff's only case is inapposite.

And these distinctions are illustrated by the Restatement
provision plaintiff relies on. As stated above, the issue here
essentially concerns whether the business's labor replacement
costs were sufficiently connected to plaintiff's personal earning
capacity to make a jury award based upon such costs sufficiently
certain to be sustainable.

The comments to section 924 expressly

direct the reader to section 912 for guidance on that question:
"(See § 912, comment d, on the requirements of certainty in
making proof of this [damages sustained by an "injured person who
owned or was operating a business deprived of his services by
injury"])."

See Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 924 comment c.

Section 912, comment d, in turn, provides in pertinent part:

-10-

As a condition to recovery for loss of earnings or
earning capacity, the person harmed must offer
evidence, convincing to the trier of fact, that a
significant amount of earnings have been lost, or that
his earning capacity has been significantly harmed. To
do this he must introduce evidence of the amount of
earnings received prior to the time of the injury, or
the amount that he was capable of obtaining, and at
east some evidence having a tendency to show that he
could have earned something during the period in which
loss of earnings is claimed. (See Illustrations 6 and
7 and § 924, comments c, d and e ) .
Id. at § 912 comment d.

And illustrations 6 and 7 are as

provided in defendants1 opening brief:
A negligently harms B, a physician, who as a
result is unable to attend to this patients. No
evidence is offered of his income except that he had
been practicing medicine in a small town for 8 years.
B is entitled only to nominal damages.
The same facts as [above] except that evidence is
introduced to show that B's average income for the two
years preceding the injury was $20,000, and that during
his incapacity, while he employed a substitute at an
expense of $10,000 yearly, his receipts from the
practice dropped to $7,500 yearly.
Id.
This case is like the first illustration.

Plaintiff

introduced evidence that because of her injury she could not do
the same tasks in the family business as she did before, and had
to hire substitutes to perform those tasks. As in the first
illustration, that proof allows an inference plaintiff may have
lost earning capacity in some unknown amount.

It is this

inference plaintiff would have the Court focus on, and go no
further.
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But, and also as in the first illustration, plaintiff
offered no evidence of any personal income from the business, let
alone in any particular amount of personal income.

She did not

show her time in the business was less valuable after the
accident.

Gross receipts from the business actually rose after

the accident, and for all anyone knows, the business might more
effectively produce income with plaintiff spending more time in
management, or just less time out mowing lawns.
Thus pursuant to the illustrations of the Restatements
principles, plaintiff's evidence was sufficiently speculative she
would be entitled only to nominal damages.

The trial court's

instruction, however, and for no reason plaintiff can articulate,
expressly equated plaintiff's damages with the labor replacement
costs the jury had been given:

"[plaintiff's] damages are the

value of [her] services in the business during the period."

See

R. at p. 306, Instruction No. 29.
In this regard, plaintiff points out the jury awarded only
some $70,000.00 of the $181,000.00 actually requested by
plaintiff for lost earning capacity.

Plaintiff thus argues the

jury must not have been confused by the instructions read as a
whole, and didn't follow the court's direction.

See Plaintiff's

Brief at pp. 25-27.
But plaintiff's argument ignores the contradiction between
the instructions she relies on and the one she supports, and the
lack of evidence plaintiff personally lost any income or capacity
-12-

to produce income because the business was required to replace a
portion of her labor, let alone $70,000.00. Although defendants
certainly did argue that the labor replacement cost evidence was
only some evidence of the value of plaintiff's time in accordance
with the rest of the instructions as plaintiff points out,
Instruction No. 29 improperly took that argument away from
defendants.
Instead of only a factor to be considered under Instruction
No. 28 and the other instructions read together, Instruction No.
29 told the jury the lost time evidence constituted plaintiff's
damages as a matter of law.

Under the circumstances, the jury

instruction alone entitles defendants to a new trial.

See Brady

v. Gibb. 886 P.2d 104, 106 (Utah App. 1994) ("[T]rial court
confused the jury by instructing it to decide the case based on
common knowledge or experience while, at the same time,
instructing the jury that it had to decide the case based on
expert opinion," thus requiring reversal because of "a reasonable
likelihood that the jury's verdict may have been different absent
the error.") and Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1
(Utah App. 1989) (instructions incorporating plaintiff's expert
testimony on standard of care prejudiced defendant and required
reversal).

-13-

POINT III
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SHOW HOW THE STATUTE AT ISSUE OR
LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE STATUTE SUPPORTS AN AWARD
OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON ANY KIND OF LOST EARNINGS
CAPACITY, WHETHER PAST OR FUTURE.
In opposition to defendants1 argument Utah Code Ann. § 7827-44 does not authorize prejudgment interest on an award of
"lost earning capacity," whether past or future, plaintiff points
out only that the statute does not expressly exclude prejudgment
interest on past lost earning capacity, like it does on future
lost earning capacity.

See Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 28-29.

Plaintiff then leaps to the unsupported conclusion that the trial
court's award thus "falls squarely within the express language of
the statute."

Id.

Plaintiff's argument fails because where the language of the
statute does not expressly cover the question, the Court must
look to the legislative intent.

See Gleave v. Denver & Rio

Grande, 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App. 1988) (in construing this
statute Utah courts "must give effect to the legislature's
underlying intent.").

The legislature did not intend to provide

for an award of prejudgment interest on past lost earning
capacity under the present circumstances.
The legislative history as illustrated by the Gleave opinion
indicates that prejudgment interest should only be awarded on:
those expenses that [plaintiffs] have paid out of their
pocket, for which they have used their own money and
which they will not get until the settlement of their
action. Getting interest on their out of pocket
-14-

expenses will provide a total recoupment of any
expenses that they have had from the time of accident
until they are paid in full by recover at court or by
settlement.
Id.
As set forth at length above, there was no evidence
presented to the jury that plaintiff herself incurred any outof-pocket expenses in the form of lost wages or actual lost
earnings whatsoever.

In fact it is undisputed plaintiff had no

personal earnings from the business and did not expect any until
sometime after the trial.

The only evidence presented was that

the plaintiff's business incurred labor replacement costs, which
may or may not have had any effect whatsoever on plaintiff's
actual income.
Under the circumstances, the addition of prejudgment
interest on any amount of lost earning capacity up until the time
of trial was inappropriate as inconsistent with the statutory
intent, whether or not specifically prohibited by the statute.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
For the reasons stated above and in defendants' opening
brief, defendants respectfully request this Court's Order
remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to enter
judgment in accordance with defendants' Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict on plaintiff's claim for lost earning
capacity.

In the alternative, defendants request the Court's

order remanding the case for a new trial, and order that
-15-

prejudgment interest is not properly added to damages awarded for
"lost earning capacity," whether past or future.
DATED this 2- /

aay of February, 1995.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Robert C. Keller
Attorneys for Defendants/
Appellants
SH\RCK\06205.253\BIGORPLY.BRF
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